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Abstract: The holdup problem plays a central role in explaining governance choices in general and project delivery system selection in
particular. This problem arises because of the asymmetrical distribution of quasi-rents between two trading parties. To put this theoretical
proposition to a direct test, this research first uses the Nash bargaining model to derive a hypothesis that links quasi-rent differences to the
excess profit margin that the contractor can achieve in ex post negotiations, and then collates a data set of 62 change-order cases to enable the
hypothesis to be tested econometrically. The corroboration of the hypothesis lends empirical support to the core argument used in the analysis
of construction holdup problems. This finding brings to the foreground the significance of recognizing that change orders might be attributed
to the owner’s strategic choice. Ignorance of this factor would bias the coefficient estimation in the empirical analysis of change orders. DOI:
10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000957. This work is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International license, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
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Introduction
Construction procurement involves a process in which the inputs
from different participants are coordinated to produce a physical
asset in accordance with the owner’s requirements. The efficiency
of the contracting process depends not only on how hard project
participants have worked towards the owner’s interest, but also
on the way that project surplus is divided among parties exposed
to various risks. In traditional design-bid-construction systems, the
owner leverages price competition to drive down the contractor’s
“promised” cost ex ante and steps up monitoring to secure the
achievement of this promise ex post. History evinces that this
“squeeze-and-protect” strategy has led to excessive sources being
applied to litigation (Latham 1994). A major cause of dispute stems
from the contractor’s tendency to exploit the owner’s bargaining
disadvantage in the postcontract stage owing to the presence of ap-
propriable quasi-rent (AQR) (Chang 2013b; Chang and Ive 2007b).
It is the origin of the well-known holdup problem in the construc-
tion context. Change orders are prevalent in construction projects
(Finkel 1997; Sun and Meng 2009). The occurrence of a change
order would damage the trust base between the parties if the price
charged by the contractor is perceived to be “exorbitant” (Masten
et al. 1991). As suggested by the Coase theorem, making postcon-
tract changes should not be a problem if frictionless bargaining can
be achieved to ensure that trading parties agree on the deal that
maximizes the joint interests of both parties (Farrell 1987). Perfect
information, an underlying assumption of frictionless bargaining,
can also make it feasible to implement theoretical solutions to
holdup problems by assigning full bargaining power to one party
through a contract (Aghion et al. 1994; Chung 1991). However, in
most real-life scenarios where traders face severe information
incompleteness, this contractual solution cannot be enforced by
the third party; thus, renegotiation still needs to be called upon
to resolve the pricing of new orders. Whereas the ex post adaptabil-
ity problem has occupied the central place in the theory of organi-
zational economics (Baker et al., unpublished data, 2011), the
empirical test is mostly focused on the connection between gover-
nance choices and relevant determinants. There is a lack of direct
evidence of whether AQR can really serve as a good predictor for
the outcome of postcontract negotiations. This research fills this
gap by delving into the contracting process through developing
a testable hypothesis using the Nash bargaining model and inves-
tigating the impact of the difference in profit margins achieved ex
post and ex ante by the contractor. The statistical link found lends
support to the core argument of an expanding body of literature on
construction holdup problems (Chang 2013a, b, c; Chang and
Ive 2007b).
This research also has implications for the study of change
orders. While this common problem in construction has been
heavily investigated by project/construction management research-
ers, the existing works have mostly focused on the statistical
relationship between change order causes and their impacts on
the contract price. Nonetheless, according to an immediate corol-
lary of this research, change orders may be due to the owner’s stra-
tegic choice, which would in turn affect the typical causes of
change orders (such as unforeseen work and quantity differences).
Giving no consideration to this factor will result in a biased
estimation of coefficients. To resolve this so-called endogeneity
problem in econometrics (Wooldridge 2010), it is useful to advance
the study of change orders by developing a behavioral model on
the basis of organizational economics or behavioral economics.
An amalgamation of the rigor of economic approaches into
engineering management research would prove to be a fruitful
way forward.
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Literature Review
This research is related to two strands of literature. The first is as-
sociated with transaction cost economics (TCE) and its application
to construction contexts. A major contribution of TCE is bringing
the dynamism of the trading relationship to the foreground by
emphasizing “the effect of transforming what may have been a
large numbers bidding competition at the outset into a small
numbers exchange relationship during the period of the contract
and at the contract renewal interval” (Williamson 2010). In this
transformation process, what is evolving is the trading parties’
bargaining power. Prior to signing a contract, the owner can harness
competitive mechanisms to elicit the best offer from the market.
However, once the contract is signed, the owner’s capital [in the
form of liquid assets (e.g., cash)] is gradually converted into the
physical asset, which has a much lower value outside the contract
than within it. In the event of premature contract termination,
the owner will incur a large loss as a result of the forced sale of
the half-completed asset, and thus would be willing to accept a less
desirable offer in postcontract negotiations than when dealing with
competition. The presence of bargaining power reversal will make
the owner lose the flexibility to make changes at reasonable prices
(Chang and Ive 2007a). As demonstrated in voluminous TCE em-
pirical studies (Macher and Richman 2008; Shelanski and Klein
1995), the presence of the holdup threat has a profound implication
for canonical governance choices (e.g., make or buy decisions). It is
also found to be crucial to the choice of project governance (Ive and
Chang 2007; Winch 2001). Different from the typical holdup set-
ting (Chang and Ive 2007a), Unsal and Taylor (2010) studied a
holdup problem occurring in the precontract stage as a result of
the lock-in effect arising from the main contractor’s sunk invest-
ment in interorganizational learning. The decision-making context
is as such: in each period, the main contractor elicits sealed bids
from two subcontractors. The main contractor chooses a subcon-
tractor to minimize the sum of “boundary cost” and subcontract
price. The boundary cost, which seems meant to capture the co-
ordination cost of joint working between two parties, is assumed
to decrease exponentially following a learning curve (i.e., the more
times that subcontractors have worked with the main contractor, the
lower the cost). It is also assumed that the subcontractor types that
differ in boundary cost are common knowledge in bidding, and the
opponent’s boundary cost is factored into one party’s bidding price.
Applying a game-theoretic bidding model developed by Criesmer
et al. (1967), the effects of learning on coordination cost and bid-
ding behavior are integrated. The main contractor faces the choice
of two strategies: selecting the subcontractor with the lowest total
cost, or switching partners for each of the first three projects. The
key finding is that where there are high task dependencies, subcon-
tractors show a stronger tendency to overprice the work, making it
more desirable to switch subcontractors more often.
The second body of literature is concerned with the causes and
management of change orders. Hsieh et al. (2004) investigated 90
Taiwanese public projects in order to identify the causes of change
orders by probing the chains of events. Of nine categories of
change-order causes, flawed planning and design are ranked as
the most serious contributor to contract price increase on the basis
of an ANOVA analysis. Wu et al. (2005) examined the change-
order cases in Taiwanese highway projects, finding that inadequate
geological survey is the major cause of change orders. Ibbs (2005)
analyzed 162 projects to explore the impact of the issuance timing
of change orders on labor productivity, confirming that the later that
changes were made, the greater the impact. Generally, the statistical
methods employed in these works are not sophisticated enough to
ascertain the robustness of their findings. With no attempt to
separate out the effect of other factors, these results should be read
with caution. Relatively, Serag et al. (2010) is an improvement in
the sense that they utilized multiple regression to filter the effects
of 11 factors on the increase in contract price and ranked the
importance of these factors in terms of the p-value of each factor’s
estimated coefficient. It was found that the top three factors are
timing of change orders (the later that change orders are issued,
the larger their impact on the price increase), quantity variations,
and occurrence of unforeseen events.
The line of reasoning implicit in the existing analysis of change
orders (Mitropoulos and Howell 2001; Serag et al. 2010; Wu et al.
2005) is that postcontract changes cause cost escalation, and hence
the reasons for these changes should be carefully diagnosed to
reduce their recurrence. Nevertheless, on a priori ground, change
orders may arise as a result of the owner’s strategic decision. For
instance, time pressure might force the owner to put the project
for tender before the technical design is fully completed. This
type of change order is of a different nature from the type that results
from uncertainty (e.g., design errors and unforeseen underground
conditions) (Chang and Ive 2003). As will be discussed later in this
paper, conflating these two types could lead to a bias in statistical
analysis.
Development of Hypotheses
Generally, change orders happen due to one of two generic reasons:
value creation or loss prevention. On the one hand, the owner may
find it desirable to change the design to increase the value of the
assets after the project is let. On the other hand, change orders may
become necessary in situations where unforeseen events occur as a
result of design omission, contingency, or policy changes. While
change orders are omnipresent in construction projects, the pricing
behavior in the negotiation of change orders is not well studied. It is
useful to put it to rigorous scrutiny in a formal model.
At a point in time (t) during the construction stage, an unexpected
event occurs. If the project does not change, the event would result in
a substantial loss to both the client and contractor. An example of this
scenario is the incidence of extremely poor ground conditions.
Without making design changes, the owner will bear a large loss,
as the building is no longer safe to erect. The contractor will suffer
as well, because it costs much more to prevent health and safety
accidents while building the foundation. For this reason, initiating
a change order may yield an efficiency gain. The construction cost
of the new work (C) is made up of the central estimate (c) and a
uniform random variable w (l ≥ w ≥ −l, with l constant). The
new work can create a benefit v for the owner. This means that
the expected surplus of this change order can be calculated as
S ¼ v − c ð1Þ
The question of interest is how great a profit margin the
contractor can achieve in pricing this work, given the bargaining
position of two parties at t.
When it comes to bargaining, Nash (1950) provided a powerful
modeling option. In the standard general setting, two players
(i ¼ 1, 2) negotiate over the division of a monetary reward (Δs)
to advance their individual wealth (s1; s2) from the status quo point
D (also known as the disagreement point or threat point) to point B
(s1; s

2) (Fig. 1). The bargaining outcome (i.e., point B) will be
determined by maximizing the Nash product (U), indicated by
the hyperbola frontier in Fig. 1; i.e.
Max
s1;s2
U ¼ ðs1 − d1Þðs2 − d2Þ
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subject to ðs1 − d1Þ þ ðs2 − d2Þ ¼ Δs
The choice of the threat point holds the key to incorporating the
details of the applied context (Binmore et al. 1986). Suppose that
the interest at stake is so large that two parties would consider walk-
ing away from the contract altogether if the negotiation for the
change order breaks down. The extent of the downside risk that
one party would withstand can be measured by the quasi-rent
(Chang 2013a, 2014). Quasi-rent indicates the return that one trader
requires in excess of the minimum to stay in the contract (Milgrom
and Roberts 1992). If both parties cannot reach an agreement,
the contractor would rather incur a loss equal to his or her
quasi-rent (Qc) by backing out of the contract than bear the blunt
of the unforeseen cost shock. Similarly, the client would prefer to
change the contractor in the event of a negotiation breakdown. As a
result, the pair (Qo;Qc) can be treated as the disagreement payoff
for this change-order negotiation.
Following the tradition of the Nash bargaining model, it is
assumed that the cost and benefit of change orders are common
knowledge for both the owner and the client in bargaining. While
the assumption of symmetric information has been widely used
in economic modeling (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995;
Hermalin and Katz 1991), this research only includes low-
complexity projects in the data set to minimize the influence of this
assumption on the result.
All together, the bargaining problem can be formulated as
follows:
Max
s1;s2
ðso þQ0Þðsc þQcÞ
subject to so þ sc ¼ S
The solution can be easily found
so ¼
1
2
ðS −ΔQÞ sc ¼ 1
2
ðSþΔQÞ ð2Þ
where ΔQ ¼ Qo −Qc. This result builds a direct link between
the negotiation outcome and the quasi-rent difference. From
Eqs. (1) and (2), the contractor’s expected markup (πa) on the
change order is
πa ¼
sc
C
¼ 1
2C
ðvþΔQÞ − 1
2
ð3Þ
The term v=C can be expressed as 1þ πb, where πb is the ratio
of the surplus from the change order to its construction cost.
Substituting this expression into Eq. (3) yields
πa − πb
2
¼ Δπ ¼ ΔQ
2C
ð4Þ
where πb=2 is a rate of return corresponding to the 50∶50 split. In
the precontract stage, when nothing has been sunk, both parties
have zero disagreement payoff, so πb=2 mimics the contractor’s
ex ante markup. It follows that the left side of Eq. (4) can be
understood as an approximation of the excess markup (Δπ) that
the contractor is able to charge under bilateral monopoly and in
response to competition. From Eq. (4), the key hypothesis to be
tested is that Δπ varies positively with ΔQ.
Hypothesis
The greater the difference between the client’s and the contrac-
tor’s quasi-rent (ΔQ), the larger the difference between ex post and
ex ante profit margin charged by the contractor.
Empirical Design
Model
As the concise form of Eq. (4) is derived by holding relevant factors
constant, it is necessary to take these factors into consideration
again in the empirical test. An effective strategy is to parameterize
the effect of the change order’s cost (C); namely, that an economet-
ric model can be set up as follows:
Δπ ¼ α0 þ α1ΔQþ Xβ ð5Þ
where X = row matrix for control variables and β = column matrix
for coefficients. By controlling for the influence of all relevant var-
iables, the sign and coefficient of α1 can prove the validity of the
hypothesis. In statistical terms,
H0 ðnull hypothesisÞ∶α1 ¼ 0
H1 ðalternative hypothesisÞ∶α1 > 0
Measurement of Quasi-rents
In empirical research design, the major challenge is the measure-
ment of the explanatory variable (ΔQ, the difference between the
client’s and contractor’s quasi-rent). First, in the literature, the con-
tractor’s quasi-rent (Qc) is mainly made up of the ex ante profit
margin and the value that would be lost if lump-sum fixed assets
were deployed elsewhere (Chang 2013b). As the data collected in
this study are from the city of Suzhou, in the Jiangsu province of
China, there may be some local conditions to consider in estimating
quasi-rent. The first element can be obtained by asking the respond-
ent to provide the markup (x) that has been factored into the bidding
price. Regarding the second element, with reference to several
consultations with local practitioners, in current Chinese practice,
the rental contract of machines cannot be easily cancelled, and
key management personnel dedicated to the project cannot be
mobilized to other projects without incurring considerable cost
should the contract terminate. It is sensible to treat the sum of these
two costs as an upper-bound estimate of the contractor’s quasi-rent.
According to the cost breakdown of local construction projects
published by the Suzhou Engineering Cost Association, an
approximate estimate is about 5% of the contract value on average.
Besides, the lock-in effect of the contractor’s quasi-rent will
decrease gradually as time passes, so
Qc ¼ K ×
ðxþ 5Þ
100
× ð1 − yÞ ð6Þ
Fig. 1. Nash bargaining model
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where K and y indicate the contract value and the completion per-
centage, respectively.
Regarding the owner’s quasi-rent, there are three significant
elements: First, the opportunity cost of delay can be estimated
approximately as the product of the average length of delay and
the average opportunity cost of delay per day. The three local
experts consulted in this study estimated that it would take an aver-
age of 30 days to retender the project with a daily hidden loss
roughly equal to the capital spent on the contract per day (K=T,
with T being the project duration in days). Second, contractor
replacement would entail extra expenses approximately equal to
8% of the contract value to cover repeated setup costs on site
(e.g., costs for installing machines, temporary office, and manage-
ment hardware such as computers). Third, the quality premium
charged by the replacement contractor would incur roughly an extra
cost of 5% of the contract value. The first and third elements are
time-dependent, so the owner’s quasi-rent can be expressed as
Qo ¼
K
T
× 30 × ð1 − yÞ þ K × 8%þ K × 5% × ð1 − yÞ ð7Þ
Control Variables
To insulate the effect of quasi-rent, seven control variables are
considered in the empirical model. The variable names in bracket
are the labels shown on the output table.
1. Relation (relation)
In TCE, one party’s tendency to exploit the other party’s
vulnerability can be modeled as a probability problem (Tadelis
and Williamson 2013). In the equilibrium of a one-shot game,
the strategy of reaping short-term gain is mostly dominant over
the strategy aiming for long-term benefit. However, in
relational contracting, the potential future benefit would be
factored into today’s decision (Baker et al. 2002) and therefore
enlarge the self-enforcing range of the contract (Klein 1996).
To control for this factor, the respondent is asked to evaluate
the closeness of relationship with the owner on a scale of 1 to
10; the higher the score, the stronger the contractor’s tie with
the owner.
2. Tendering method (tender)
The project procured through competitive tendering is
coded as 1; otherwise, it is 0.
3. Project value (l_projectsize)
Project value is measured by the logarithm of contract
value in renminbi (RMB).
4. Project types (housing, office, factory, shop)
Projects are classified into five groups: residential, office,
factory, retail, and other. Four dummy variables are created to
control for this variable.
5. Types of change order (contingency, design_omission,
design_change, policy_change)
Change orders under study are grouped into five types in
accordance with the reasons of new order: contingency, design
omission, design change, policy change, and others. Four
dummies are created to capture the effect of this variable.
6. Occurrence time (occtime)
Occurrence time is measured by completion percentage
when the change order takes place. For example, if a change
order is issued in the second month of a 12-month project, this
variable equals 0.17 (2=12).
7. Pricing method (pricing_method)
Pricing method indicates the way that the price of change
order is calculated; coded as 1 if the negotiation makes no
reference to the original contract, and 0 if it is based on the
original contract (e.g., unit rates).
Data Collection
To secure the return rate, all the data in this research were collected
through questionnaire-based interviews. A total of 21 visits were
made to 21 contractors to collect data concerning 62 change-order
cases. Table 1 summarizes the 21 projects where these change
orders took place. The average project value and duration were
22.44 million RMB and 249 days. The average expected profit
margin was 5.6%. The sample set contained a good balance of
project types (residential project 29%, office 9%, factory 33%, shop
5%, and others 24%). Design change (45%) tops the list of change-
order reasons. Other reasons include contingency (21%), design
omission (16%), policy change (11%), and other (7%). As reported
in Table 2, the occurrence time of the change orders under study
spanned all stages of the construction. The average ex post profit
margin achieved is around 9.5%, which is a premium of 3.9%
relative to the average ex ante profit margin.
Results
The central prediction of the model presented in Eq. (4) is that the
bargaining disadvantage facing the owner, as measured by the
difference between her quasi-rent and the contractor’s, would lead
him or her to give away more ground to the contractor when
negotiating a change order. It is hypothesized that the size of extra
markup (Δπ) conceded relative to that which results from
competition is proportional to the quasi-rent difference (ΔQ).
Table 3 reports the ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation of three
econometric models that differ in the number of variables being
controlled for. All estimates are robust for homoscedasticity using
the function provided by the econometric software Stata 10.
In model 1, ΔQ (measured in million RMB) proves to be a
statistically significant predictor for Δπ at a 95% confidence level
with a coefficient of 0.00734. It means that an increase of 1 million
RMB in quasi-rent difference can lead to an extra markup of 0.73%
being achieved by the contractor in postcontract negotiations. It is
also interesting to look at the influence of control variables. First, it
can be argued with a 95% confidence level that the contractor’s
Table 1. Background Information of the Projects under Study
Project number
Project value
(million RMB) Duration (days)
Expected ex
ante markup (%)
Project 1 25.50 360 6
Project 2 24.02 300 5
Project 3 18.20 180 6
Project 4 20.64 210 5
Project 5 19.67 210 4
Project 6 11.60 360 6
Project 7 68.69 470 4
Project 8 6.80 150 10
Project 9 4.80 120 6
Project 10 23.26 230 4
Project 11 17.65 190 4
Project 12 6.56 180 5
Project 13 18.70 180 4
Project 14 4.56 300 5
Project 15 4.92 210 6
Project 16 10.35 146 7
Project 17 65.72 400 8
Project 18 8.42 200 5
Project 19 82.56 410 4
Project 20 22.05 210 8
Project 21 6.6 220 5
Average 22.44 249 5.6
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existing tie with the owner would lead the contractor to demand a
smaller excess markup. Second, the ex ante use of competitive
tendering reduces the magnitude of the excess margin achieved
ex post. Third, the causes of change order may impinge upon
the extent that an excessive profit margin can be achieved. As
opposed to the contingency-induced change order, which has a
negative effect on the excess profit margin, the contractor can
charge a higher margin with change orders caused by design
omission or policy change. But when more factors are controlled
for in models 2 and 3, only contingency remains a significant var-
iable. Generally, the result concerning the effect of change-order
types should be read with caution. Further investigation is needed.
The variables contained in model 1 can explain 55% of the var-
iations in Δπ, which indicate the model fits the data reasonably
well. It is also confirmed by the F-ratio test (p < 0.05). Models
2 and 3 are designed to check the stability of coefficient estimates
when the more relevant variables occurrence time and pricing
method are added to the model. The sign, coefficient, and signifi-
cance level of Δπ remain stable, which lends credence to the ro-
bustness of the model. The study also conducted standard checks
on multilinearity by computing the variance inflation factor (VIF),
finding that the factor is fairly low (1.8) compared to the threshold
value of 10 suggested by Chatterjee and Price (1991).
Discussions and Implications
The corroboration of the link between quasi-rent and the postcon-
tract negotiation outcome has both theoretical and practical
implications. In economics, quasi-rent has played a central role
in explaining various contracting practices (Goldberg 1976; Klein
et al. 1978; Klein and Leffler 1981; Williamson 1971). Governance
structures should promote efficiency by securing the fair allocation
of quasi-rents between parties (Crocker and Masten 1991; Zingales
1998). However, TCE empirical studies are mostly concerned with
the reduced-form predictions; i.e., the causal relationship between
transaction attributes and the governance structures chosen (Masten
and Saussier 2000), leaving the core of the reasoning not empiri-
cally examined. At the center of transaction cost arguments lies a
proposition that the magnitude of transaction cost is proportional to
AQR (Gibbons 2005). The presence of AQR would intensify one
party’s tendency to seek an excessive price premium in postcontract
negations with the vulnerable party, which is generally perceived as
hostile and tends to trigger an aggressive pushback. The costly
process of dispute resolution and its incidental effect on the ex ante
incentive to investment, known as underinvestment problems
(Grout 1984; Tirole 1986), are the main source of inefficiency.
While transaction cost arguments have been so extensively inves-
tigated, there is still a lack of direct evidence about the predictive
power of AQR for price premiums in postcontract negotiations. The
finding of this research gives evidential support for the plausibility
of this argument in the construction context.
The second implication is for the study of change orders.
Making changes is not necessarily a bad thing in itself, as it could
help achieve a better outcome after the resolution of risk. Where
change orders are settled smoothly reflective of parties’ bargaining
power, as in the 62 change orders examined in the current study, the
cost of a change order is limited to the price premium. There might
be a tradeoff between ex ante investment in design development to
avoid change orders and a price premium required for the same
outcome through a change order ex post. Change orders arising
from strategic considerations should be differentiated from those
caused by design errors/omission. Ignorance of this distinction
would result in so-called endogeneity problems, thus undermining
Table 2. Summary of Change Orders
Change order
number Occurrence time Profit margin (%)
1 0.3 8
2 0.8 10
3 0.1 15
4 0.15 10
5 0.9 10
6 0.2 7
7 0.1 10
8 0.8 15
9 0.15 10
10 0.5 7
11 0.6 10
12 0.2 7
13 0.1 10
14 0.8 10
15 0.4 6
16 0.9 5
17 0.1 11
18 0.1 5
19 0.2 6
20 0.15 6
21 0.7 5
22 0.1 14
23 0.2 12
24 0.4 15
25 0.5 12
26 0.7 14
27 0.8 14
28 0.2 14
29 0.9 7
30 0.1 9
31 0.15 8
32 0.8 10
33 0.8 8
34 0.1 9
35 0.8 8
36 0.9 5
37 0.2 9
38 0.9 6
39 0.2 10
40 0.4 8
41 0.8 10
42 0.3 12
43 0.8 7
44 0.2 16
45 0.9 7
46 0.2 12
47 0.9 10
48 0.2 15
49 0.6 12
50 0.8 10
51 0.8 7
52 0.2 11
53 0.8 6
54 0.8 8
55 0.9 5
56 0.1 10
57 0.8 10
58 0.9 9
59 0.6 9
60 0.1 10
61 0.2 9
62 0.8 6
Average 0.48 9.45
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the reliability of coefficient estimates (Gulati and Nickerson 2008).
In the current change orders study, where the statistical link is es-
tablished between a set of explanatory variables (causes of change
order) and the contract value increase, the importance of these
causes is mainly determined by the coefficients’ p-value. A crucial
assumption of multiple regression models is that there is no
correlation between explanatory variables and the error term
(Wooldridge 2010). When this assumption does not hold, estima-
tion of coefficients would be biased, making the p-value unreliable.
This endogeneity problem would arise for three reasons: omitted
variables, measurement error, or simultaneity (Hamilton and
Nickerson 2003). A canonical example is whether smaller class
size has led to an improvement in academic performance. The issue
of simultaneity would be present because poor schools tend to get
more funding from the government and thus have more resources to
reduce class size (Stock and Watson 2003). The two-way interplay
of the explained variable and the explanatory variables causes bias
in statistical estimation. Endogeneity would also cast doubt on the
reliability of the statistical results found in the literature of change
orders, but for a different reason. It is generally accepted that
the later the change is made, the greater its impact on the price in-
crease (Ibbs 2005). This result is not as informative as it appears.
An analogy can be drawn to cancer. Late detection always takes
considerably more resources to cure the disease. As a result, the
real question is why change orders are made so late. Is it purely
a matter of uncertainty, or is it also involved with a strategic choice?
There might be an economic argument that change orders should
not be entirely avoided ex ante because the extra price paid for a
change order could be cheaper than the cost entailed at the outset
to completely prevent it. Omission of this factor in the model
would yield endogeneity problems. For example, according to
Serag et al. (2010), quantity differences, unforeseen work, and de-
sign that is unfit for operational requirements are all found as sig-
nificant causes for change orders. However, these factors have one
thing in common: they may all be affected by the choice of design
incompleteness. Without taking this factor into account, the effect
of these factors would be overestimated in econometric models
(i.e., it would be an insignificant variable mistakenly judged to
be significant). An instrumental way of advancing the studies of
change orders is through the development of a behavioral model
that is sophisticated enough to capture the effect of strategic
contractual incompleteness on change orders, whereby the endoge-
neity bias can be corrected in future empirical investigations
into change orders. This suggestion also echoes the key insight of
Table 3. Results of Econometric Analysis
Variable number Variable name Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Δπ Δπ Δπ
X1 ΔQ 0.00734
a 0.00871a 0.00824a
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Control variable
X2 Relation −0.00542a −0.00564a −0.00561a
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024)
X3 Tender −0.0170b −0.0166b −0.0154a
(0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0065)
X4 l_projectsize 0.0126 0.0157
c 0.0144
(0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0096)
Project type
X5 Housing −0.00246 −0.00211 −0.00391
(0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0090)
X6 Office 0.00474 0.00505 0.00260
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0128)
X7 Factory 0.00119 0.00171 −0.00007
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0096)
X8 Shop −0.00682 −0.00710 −0.00709
(0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0145)
Types of change order
X9 Contingency −0.0213a −0.0221a −0.0233a
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0089)
X10 Design_omission 0.0270
b 0.0183 0.0176
(0.0094) (0.0113) (0.0115)
X11 Design_change −0.00167 −0.00543 −0.00540
(0.0079) (0.0082) (0.0083)
X12 Policy_change 0.0254
a 0.0220a 0.0175
(0.0101) (0.0103) (0.0136)
X13 Occtime 0.0136 0.0142
(0.0098) (0.0100)
X14 Pricing_method −0.00479
(0.0093)
Constant 0.0197 0.0225 0.0248
(0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0236)
N 62 62 62
R2 0.550 0.567 0.569
ap < 0.05.
bp < 0.01.
cp < 0.1.
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Bajari and Tadelis (2001) that design incompleteness is an
endogenous variable for the transaction cost of construction
procurement.
The third implication is associated with dispute resolution. In
the 62 change-order cases, the agreements over price were reached
in a relatively smooth way, generally in line with the bargaining
power of two parties. The bargaining solutions can serve as useful
reference points for postcontract negotiations. Acknowledging the
presence of bargaining power imbalance between the owner and the
contractor would help both parties take a more realistic stance
towards the settlement of disputes. The establishment of the “fair”
price with consideration of bargaining power from the outset
should be beneficial to the management of disputes. There is grow-
ing evidence from behavioral economics that the perception of
“status quo” (Kahneman 1992; Kahneman et al. 1991) and “fair-
ness” (Bartling 2011) could be crucial in shaping people’s deci-
sions. Further effort can be built upon the current research to
explore the effect of these behavioral factors on the severity of
holdup problems. Moreover, a careful consideration of bargaining
position can help the owner get her way with low transaction costs.
For example, in formulating a strategy for dealing with the contrac-
tor, the owner can choose to act more wisely in deciding when to
push hard with requirements and when to turn a blind eye to
slightly substandard output by considering his or her bargaining
position at that time.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies
The theoretical prediction of this research has general applicability,
but the empirical study has limitations. First, three simplifying as-
sumptions are made in the quasi-rent formulas: the contractor’s
sunk cost (5% of the project value), the time needed for retender
(30 days), and the risk premium required by the replacement
contractor (8% of the project value). These figures are based on
the average of evaluations from three senior local experts and
are assumed to be invariant across all projects. For this invariability
assumption to work, the project with a maximum value of
100 million RMB and containing low technical complexity was
chosen. This strategy is chosen because the pilot study found that
respondents could not provide reliable estimates in interviews. For
the purpose of this research, it seems to be an effective strategy, but
these assumptions can be improved upon through development of
formal models. For example, the price premium can be estimated
using a bidding model. However, as seen in the existing models
(Criesmer et al. 1967; McAfee and McMillan 1986), this entails
estimation of numerous parameters, which inevitably creates con-
siderable difficulty in data collection. Hopefully, the emergence of
big data studies and the growing application of building informa-
tion modeling techniques would make it feasible to estimate
relevant parameters reliably in the future.
Second, the size of the sample set analyzed in this research is
limited by the sensibility of the information requested from the
main contractor. Around half of the contractors approached in this
study were put off for this reason. As cost-estimating practices
would affect how markups are calculated by individual contractors,
local cost engineering associations for referral were considered.
While sampling bias arising from selective participation of contrac-
tors in the current study is benign, it seems useful in the future to
test the core hypothesis of this research in broader national and
international contexts.
Third, linear quasi-rents formulas [e.g., Eqs. (6) and (7)] have
particular strength in analyzing the data collected from fieldworks.
However, the effect of nonlinearity should not be precluded.
As seen in the study of incentive contracts, addressing this issue
requires a different approach, such as experimental methods and
simulation-based methods (Basu and Kalyanaram 1990). This topic
is worth further exploration.
Conclusions
This research makes a first attempt to draw on the Nash bargaining
model to derive the relationship between quasi-rent difference and
excess profit margin in the pricing of change orders and put this
theoretical prediction to an empirical test on the basis of 62 change
orders from 21 projects using econometric models. The owner’s
postcontract bargaining disadvantage manifests itself in the higher
profit margin paid for change orders. This finding lends credence to
the central proposition taken in the analysis of construction holdup
problems that the owner is vulnerable in postcontract negotiations.
This finding brings to the foreground the significance of recogniz-
ing that change orders might result from the owner’s strategic
choice. Ignorance of this factor would lead to an overestimation
of the statistical importance of alleged change-order causes
(e.g., extra work). An important way of advancing the existing
studies of change orders is to develop a behavioral model that
accommodates this factor.
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